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I. INTRODUCTION
The accelerating pace of change in technology and business envi-
ronments in today's economy highlights the importance of successful
innovation. Technological advances and deregulation in some indus-
tries, such as telecommunications, mean that many of the assumptions
used in operating a business in the past may require fundamental re-
examination in both the short and long terms. Globalization of markets
is requiring many Canadian firms to achieve international standards of
quality, efficiency, and cost control in a relatively expeditious manner.
* Mr. Calvin Goldman is a partner with Davies, Ward & Beck in Toronto, Canada.
** Mr. John Bodrug is also a partner with Davies, Ward & Beck in Toronto, Canada.
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Even today's dominant firms must constantly re-evaluate their prod-
ucts, production, and marketing.
Under these conditions, cooperation between competing firms can
be essential for creating new or modified products and bringing them to
market, and also for achieving efficiencies of production or distribution
to enable Canadian firms to compete better at home, in the United
States, or in other foreign markets. Benchmarking exercises, for exam-
ple, can be powerful tools in analyzing a firm's cost structure in com-
parison to the best practice in the industry and identifying areas that
can be improved.' In this regard, a member of the legal staff of Gen-
eral Motors in the United States has reported that "through competi-
tive benchmarking, automobile manufacturers discovered and corrected
minor differences in their procedures that cost suppliers millions of dol-
lars and added little value. By harmonizing non-critical and non-com-
petitive processes, automakers lowered their own and suppliers' costs."2
Communications between independent firms that do not compete
with one another rarely raise issues under antitrust law; however, anti-
trust law and policy is generally suspicious of any collaboration be-
tween competitors, or at least collaboration between competitors who
collectively possess market power.' Nevertheless, it is important to re-
member that the thrust of the policy underlying this concern is a desire
to preserve free markets and promote competition.' The Director of the
Canadian Competition Bureau has commented that the Competition
Act, the Canadian antitrust legislation, "does not see competition as an
end in itself. Rather, competition is a means to achieve dynamic effi-
ciencies in the economy, and to provide competitive prices and quality
products and services to Canadian industry and consumers. ' 5
Although there has been considerable discussion recently by U.S.
antitrust authorities in relation to the concept of "innovation markets"
I See, e.g., Paul S. Crampton, Benchmarking and Other Types of Information Sharing, Pa-
per Delivered to Insight Conference on Emerging Issues in Competition Law, Toronto, Ontario
(Mar. 10, 1994). See also Thomas Jorde & David Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal
Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialized Technology, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 579 (1993) for a more detailed discussion of benchmarking from a U.S. antitrust
perspective.
2 William B. Slowey, Benchmarking: Boon or Buzz Word?, 7 ANTITRUST 30 (Sum. 1993).
* See Michael Wiener, Distinguishing the Legitimate from the Unlawful, 7 ANTITRUST 22
(Sum. 1993).
' At the same time, some elements of Canadian antitrust legislation, such as the price dis-
crimination provisions, appear to have been enacted with a view to protecting small businesses.
See, e.g., Calvin S. Goldman & John D. Bodrug, The Canadian Price Discrimination Enforce-
ment Guidelines and Their Application to Cross-Border Transactions, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 635,
637-38 (1994).
5 George N. Addy, The Canadian Competition Act as a Model of Flexible, Forward-Look-
ing Competition Law, Address to the Conference on the Promotion of Competitiveness in Mexico,
Monterrey, Neuvo Leon, Mexico (Oct. 5, 1993). See also Calvin S. Goldman et al, The Role of
Competition Policy in Canada's Industrial Policy, 19 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 105 (1993).
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for purposes of their analysis of mergers, this Article provides only a
brief survey of this concept.6 In addition, this Article does not discuss
in detail when the antitrust authorities in either the United States or
Canada ought to engage in trying to define an innovation market in the
context of evaluating mergers. To do so would entail an analysis that
would go well beyond the scope of this Article.7 The concept of an in-
novation market has not yet found its way into the analysis of mergers
by Canadian competition law authorities; however, given the recent de-
velopments in the United States, it is likely only a matter of time
before this occurs.
Antitrust literature is increasingly recognizing that the concept of
innovation, which had not been at the forefront of antitrust analysis, is
now of considerable importance. In this regard, Richard Gilbert and
Steven Sunshine of the U.S. Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) have stated:
6 See discussion infra pp. 27-30. Innovation markets are discussed in some detail by Susan S.
DeSanti, Assistant Director of the Office of Policy & Evaluation, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission, in Susan S. DeSanti, Innovation and Merger Enforcement: The View from
the FTC, Paper Delivered to the ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting in Washington, D.C.
(Apr. 6, 1995).
In that paper she indicates that "[i]nnovation markets include intellectual property, and they
may include goods where those goods are close substitutes for innovation efforts, but they also go
beyond technology and goods markets, to encompass R&D spending and the process of creating
new products." Id. at 17. The author then states that the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property, released on April 6, 1995, define an innovation market as consist-
ing of:
[T]he research and development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes,
and the close substitutes for that research and development. The close substitutes are re-
search and development efforts, technologies, and goods that significantly constrain the exer-
cise of market power with respect to the relevant research and development, for example by
limiting the ability and incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of research
and development. The Agencies will delineate an innovation market only when the capabili-
ties to engage in the relevant research and development can be associated with specialized
assets or characteristics of specific firms. Id.
7 Id.; see also Richard J. Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property: New Signposts for the Intersection of Intellectual Property and The Antitrust Laws,
Paper Delivered to the ABA Antitrust Section, Spring Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 6, 1995).
The author states that: "[U]sing an innovation market to analyze competitive effects is appropri-
ate if the competitive effects of an arrangement cannot be adequately analyzed in conventional
product markets." Id. at 4; Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Economics and Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Mergers, respectively, Anti-
trust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger
Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995). The authors state that:
"[I]nnovation raises competition issues in three distinct categories of product markets: markets for
existing products, the R&D process itself, and markets for future products." (citing William F.
Baxter, The Definition Measurement of Market Power in Industries Characterized by Rapidly
Developing and Changing Technologies, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 717 (1984) Id. at 571. Barry A.
Pupkin, Widening Antitrust Coverage in the Era of Technology, MaRGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
Nov./Dec. 1994, at 7.
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[A] ntitrust analysis typically does not dwell on the nonprice aspects of
competition. One reason is the difficulty of assessing consumer bene-
fits from particular forms of nonprice competition . . . . For many
years, innovation shared the general neglect bestowed by antitrust au-
thorities on other forms of nonprice competition. However, innova-
tion's crucial role in generating economic growth and in enhancing
global competitiveness warrants a more central role in antitrust
analysis.'
Along similar lines, Susan DeSanti of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has recently pointed out:
[B]usiness leaders and economists alike increasingly realize that inno-
vation is vital to efficient production and distribution. . . . Innovation
is vital to the nation's economic efficiency, on both a macroeconomic
and a microeconomic level. . . . Various economic studies have con-
cluded that technological change and innovation are responsible for
the major share of the nation's economic growth.9
The same principle is readily applicable to evaluations under Canadian
competition law.10
There are, however, a number of other commentators from the pri-
vate sector who, particularly in a U.S. context, recently have raised
some concerns about the capability of current antitrust thinking to as-
sess innovation considerations properly. These concerns relate not only
to merger analysis, but also to the ability of firms to communicate with
one another in an overall effort to become more innovative and efficient
in their respective markets. It is this tension between traditional anti-
trust analysis, particularly in the Canadian context, and the need of
firms to enhance their innovative capabilities, often by sharing informa-
tion with other firms, that is the focal point of this Article.
Two of the leading U.S. commentators in this field are Thomas
Jorde and David Teece, who have published a series of articles in the
area of innovation and antitrust law."1 The authors point out that, fifty
Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 7, at 572-73.
9 DeSanti, supra note 6, at 20 (citing Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Produc-
tion Function, 39 REv. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957)); In another article by Dennis A. Yao, for-
merly of the FTC, and Susan S. DeSanti who was an Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Yao, the
authors noted that "[e]specially as rapid technological change becomes typical of the most dy-
namic industries, it is increasingly important that innovation be appropriately valued under U.S.
antitrust law." Dennis A. Yao & Susan DeSanti, Innovation Issues Under the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 506 (1993).
10 The Director's 1991 Merger Enforcement Guidelines reflect the traditional focus when
they state that "in evaluating whether the market power of the merging parties is likely to be
greater than if the merger does not proceed, the focus is normally on the price dimension of
competition." DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES,
INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 5, § 2.1 (Hull, Quebec: Supply and Services Canada, 1991) (herein-
after "Merger Guidelines").
" See, e.g., Slowey, supra note 2. See also Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation
[Vol. 21:127 1995
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years ago, Joseph Schumpeter recognized the central importance of in-
novation to competition, 12 and they go on to state that:
[T]o ensure that government does not impede innovation, courts eval-
uating communication and cooperation among competitors must be
especially careful to take account of the requirements of innovation
and the needs of firms to cooperate in order to innovate and success-
fully commercialize innovation. . . . Few would dispute that innova-
tion is important to economic growth, economic development, and eco-
nomic welfare. Yet antitrust analysis largely ignores it. . . . Lawyers
and economists know very little about innovation, and as they do be-
gin to understand it, there is a tendency to despair because taking it
into account impairs - if not destroys - the validity of the simple
model that many use to deal with antitrust policy issues. We believe
that much of the accepted analytical apparatus should be modified to
reflect a conceptual framework which explicitly takes innovation and
its organizational requirements into account. We view innovation as
the search for, and the discovery, development, improvement, and
adoption of new processes, new products and new organizational
structures and procedures.13
Jorde and Teece further state that policies which hinder innovation by
focusing on short-run static efficiencies and inefficiencies, as well as
welfare gains and losses, will likely have strong negative impacts on
economic welfare.14 They add that behaviour which may appear to be
anti-competitive in the static context may in fact be procompetitive in a
dynamic sense, and that since the study of innovation is largely outside
of mainstream economic research and antitrust jurisprudence, the pos-
sibility of expensive and distracting litigation followed by judicial error
is significant.1 5 These authors advocate a structural rule of reason ap-
proach that is designed to avoid such errors, particularly in relation to
information sharing designed to achieve procompetitive benchmarking
objectives. For example, the authors state that:
[I]n our view. . . there is no evidence to support the notion, common
in antitrust thinking, that ignorance of one's competitors' costs and/or
internal quality programs is procompetitive. To the contrary, knowl-
edge that one's competitors are ahead can be and has been a tremen-
dous stimulus to action. Moreover, knowledge of how competitors
achieved success can help guide a company committed to renovating
its structures and systems, lowering costs, and achieving maximum
and Co-operation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust, in COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 887 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1991).
12 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1959).
13 Slowey, supra note 2, at 581.
I4 d. at 587.
11 Id. at 590.
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It should, however, be noted that the views of Jorde and Teece are
currently subject to considerable debate in the United States.17 In addi-
tion, representatives of the Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy's
Economics and International Affairs Directorate have suggested that
the empirical evidence supporting the relationship between technologi-
cal innovation and inter-firm cooperation or market concentration is
mixed and that "[i]t is important that the law not be undermined
through efforts to accommodate theoretical arguments that have only
limited empirical application."'I s
The balance of this Article examines the extent to which the cur-
rent competition law in Canada may permit or constrain innovative de-
velopment particularly in relation to transactions or communications
between competitors, and further considers whether it should do so. In
other words, can antitrust law co-exist with innovative industrial poli-
cies and business practices? In our view, with the exception of the
criminal conspiracy provisions, Canadian antitrust law is flexible
enough to permit such co-existence. For the most part, the Canadian
law and the antitrust authorities take into account the procompetitive
aspects of cooperative behavior. However, concerns exist with respect to
the overly broad ambit of the conspiracy provisions of the Competition
Act. In this respect, we suggest that there is scope for greater recogni-
tion of potential efficiencies and innovation in assessing collaborative
conduct under the Canadian law, which likely necessitates amending
the conspiracy provision to accommodate a more modern balancing of
competing public policy objectives.
16 Id. at 597. Along similar lines, Anthony Clapes, Assistant General Counsel of IBM, has
recently stated that "[u]ntil antitrust enforcement officials become more familiar with dynamic
models in industrial organization and, in particular, until they adopt a model describing the dy-
namic interdependence and long-run consumer welfare effects of innovational competition and
market structure, the antitrust analysis of research and joint ventures should proceed with caution,
asking rather different questions than a conventional static analysis might suggest." Anthony
Clapes, Blinded by the Light: Antitrust Analysis of Computer Industry Alliances 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 899, 901 (1993). Similarly, William B. Slowey, Counsel, General Motors Corporation, has
stated that: "[t]he antitrust laws should not be a barrier to the extension of innovation even when
that goal can only be achieved by cooperation among competitors. Knowledge of state of the art
efficiencies and best in class competitors need not be a clog on competition. In fact, it should
provide a stimulus to improving a company's own programs." Slowey, supra note 2, at 31-32. Mr.
Slowey also points out that subjects like price and marketing incentives or the like generally
should be avoided in the benchmarking process. Id.
1 See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Law and Innovation Cooperation, in COLLABORA-
TIONS AMONG CONIPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 911 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1991).
18 Robert D. Anderson & S. Dlev Khosla, Economics and International Affairs Branch, Bu-
reau of Competition Policy, Competition Policy as a Dimension of Economic Policy: A Compara-
tive Perspective, Industry Canada Occasional Paper Number 7, 82-86 (May 1995).
[Vol. 21:127 1995
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II. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW
A. Administration and Enforcement of the Competition Act
Before reviewing the specific provisions of the Competition Act, it
may be helpful briefly to review its general scope and means of enforce-
ment. The 1986 Competition Act is federal legislation. It applies
throughout Canada to all sectors of the economy, including service, re-
source, and manufacturing industries. While the provinces have passed
some trade practice legislation, it is generally not a factor with respect
to the issues discussed in this Article.
The Act is administered by the Director of Investigation and Re-
search who is appointed by the federal cabinet. The Director is the
head of the Bureau of Competition Policy. The staff of the Bureau pro-
vides investigative and administrative support for the Director's statu-
tory functions. The Director is an independent law enforcement officer
and Ministers in the federal cabinet cannot direct him to make any
particular decision or recommendation, although the Minister of Indus-
try can require the Director to inquire into a particular matter.
The Director and the Bureau are responsible for the investigation
and enforcement of both criminal offences and reviewable conduct
under the Competition Act. Criminal offences are prosecuted in the
regular courts while reviewable conduct is brought before the Competi-
tion Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body comprised of both judges of the
Federal Court and lay members. Only the Director can commence a
proceeding with respect to reviewable conduct before the Tribunal.
While the Attorney General has carriage of criminal charges, he nor-
mally commences proceedings under the Competition Act only upon
the recommendation of the Director. In addition, the Director's deci-
sion whether to commence an inquiry or make an application to the
Tribunal is not subject to judicial review on the merits.1 9
Pausing on this point for a moment, the enforcement approach in
Canada may be contrasted with the current situation in the United
States. In the United States, competitors who propose to engage in a
potential collaborative project need to consider the interpretation of the
law and the enforcement policy of not only two federal agencies, but
also the antitrust authorities in each of the states that may be affected.
The state agencies actively enforce both the federal laws and their own
state antitrust laws. To the extent that the Director's enforcement poli-
cies are clear, business decision-makers in Canada can achieve a
greater degree of certainty than may exist when faced with multiple
,1 Gauthier v. Director of Investigation and Research, unreported (Oct. 2, 1991). The Direc-
tor's decisions may, however, be subject to review on general principles in the event of bias or
capriciousness.
7
Goldman and Bodrug: Antitrust Law and Innovation--Limits on Joint Research &(and) Dev
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1995
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
decision-makers enforcing the same law20 or with the risk of political
factors playing a greater role in the decision-making process, a situa-
tion which exists in the United Kingdom, for example. 21
Fines for antitrust offences in Canada were relatively low until the
maximum penalties were increased in 1986. The maximum fine for
some offences is ten million dollars; other offences have no maximum
and the fine is in the discretion of the court.22 Since 1986, significant
fines have been imposed, including a two million dollar fine for a price
fixing offence. In a current prosecution for an alleged price fixing con-
spiracy, the Attorney General has indicated publicly that he will be
seeking fines of eight million dollars from some of the defendants. Fur-
ther, the Director has stated that he intends to continue to seek higher
fines and that he would like to be remembered "as the Director who
got the first ten million dollar conspiracy fine. ' '2 3
The Director has also begun recommending that the Attorney
General seek: (1) imprisonment for persons believed to have committed
serious antitrust offences, and (2) orders prohibiting a corporation from
paying fines imposed on individual officers or employees, although the
Attorney General has so far been unsuccessful. 24 In addition, the Cana-
dian antitrust authorities recently resorted to the extradition treaty
with the United States to force an American to come to Canada to face
charges under the Competition Act.25
Thus, while the stakes in Canada are not yet as high as those in
the United States, Competition Act offences are now widely regarded
2" However, if Canadian businesses propose to engage in conduct that may have anti-compet-
itive effects in the United States, they may face the same level of uncertainty occasioned by multi-
ple enforcers.
21 See, e.g., Screaming at the Umpire, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 1995, at 217.
22 Section 36 of the Competition Act R.S. 1985, C.C-34, also provides that any person who
has suffered loss or damage as a result of either (1) conduct contrary to any of the criminal
offences under the Act, or (2) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or
any court made under the Act, may sue for and recover from the person who engaged in such
conduct an amount equal to the loss or damage suffered, together with the costs of proceeding
with and investigating the matter. To date, relatively few civil actions have been brought under
the Competition Act and it is difficult to assess the extent to which the risk of a civil action
currently acts as a deterrent to conduct that may raise issues under the criminal provisions of the
Competition Act. In any event, the risk of civil actions is likely to be less of a deterrent in Canada
than it is in the United States, where a successful plaintiff may be awarded treble damages, and
class actions and contingency fees have historically been more widely available.
2 George N. Addy, Bureau of Competition Policy Achievements of 1993; Outlook for 1994,
CANADIAN COMPETITION RECORD, Mar. 5, 1994, at 7.
2 Harry Chandler, Deputy Director of Investigation and Research, Criminal Matters, Get-
ting Down to Business: The Strategic Direction of Criminal Competition Law Enforcement in
Canada, speech #S-11414/94-02, 14 (Mar. 10, 1994). See also R. v. Royal LePage Real Estate
Services Ltd., (Dec. 20, 1994), Queen's Bench of Alberta, Judicial District of Calgary (unre-
ported) in which the Court declined to impose a term of incarceration or issue an order prohibit-
ing a corporation from paying a fine imposed on an officer for a price maintenance offence.
2 Daniel Girard, 'Sale' Brings $130,000 Fine, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 8, 1995, at B-1.
[Vol. 21:127 1995
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as serious crimes. Further, the civil provisions are more actively en-
forced and an investigation under either the civil or criminal side of the
Act can divert significant resources and management time from more
productive endeavors.
B. Relevant Legal Issues
The principal questions to be asked before embarking on a collabo-
rative project with a competitor in Canada are:
(1) Does the proposal constitute an agreement to prevent or lessen
competition unduly for the purposes of the criminal conspiracy provi-
sions of the Competition Act?
(2) Does the proposal constitute a "merger" for the purposes of the
civil merger provisions of the Competition Act and, if so, is it likely to
prevent or lessen substantially some element of competition between
the parties?
(3) Do one or more parties to the proposed project possess a dominant
position in any market that includes part or all of Canada for the
purposes of the civil abuse of dominant position provisions of the
Competition Act? If so, is the proposed conduct likely to have any
significant exclusionary, disciplinary or predatory effect on a competi-
tor that may be considered to prevent or lessen competition
substantially?
(4) Is the proposed project likely to have any anti-competitive effects
on consumers, customers, exporters or other persons in the United
States or other foreign jurisdictions that may raise issues under the
antitrust laws of the United States or any other country?
If any of these situations apply, it is then appropriate to consider
whether any exemption or defence may be available. With regard to
the Canadian legislation, it may be noted that different analytical fac-
tors and defences may apply with respect to the criminal and civil pro-
visions of the Act. For example, efficiency gains play a greater role in
the analysis under the civil provisions than is permitted under the case
law to date relating to the criminal conspiracy provisions.
C. Agreements in Restraint of Trade
The Competition Act contains, in section 45, a general prohibition
on conspiracies or agreements to restrain or injure competition unduly.
This provision has been applied most frequently in the context of price
fixing or market allocation agreements and group boycotts.
Section 45 does not encompass conscious parallelism. Without an
agreement, understanding or mutual consent between two or more par-
ties, there can be no section 45 offence even if two competitors follow
each other's prices or conform with respect to other aspects of competi-
tion between them. However, an agreement can be proven through a
course of conduct or circumstantial evidence, and it is not necessary for
9
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the agreement to have been carried into effect. For example, the ex-
change of competitively sensitive information, followed by parallel con-
duct, may lead a court to infer the existence of an agreement. Further,
it is not necessary that the parties to an agreement specifically intend
to lessen competition. An offence may be committed if the parties in-
tended to enter into the agreement and knew its terms, and the parties,
as reasonable business persons, knew or should have known that the
effect of the agreement would be to prevent or lessen competition
unduly.26
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Nova Scotia Phar-
maceutical Society case (also known as "PANS") defined "unduly" in
terms of the ability of the parties to an agreement to exercise a moder-
ate degree of market power. The Court held that, in order to constitute
an offence, an agreement must have an anti-competitive effect and the
parties to the agreement must possess at least a moderate degree of
market power.
Mr. Justice Gonthier, writing the unanimous decision of the Court
in the PANS case, said that "market power is the ability to behave
relatively independently of the market" and that "the level of market
power necessary to trigger the application of [section 45]" is not as
high as substantial or complete control. He added that "what is more
relevant is the capacity to behave independently of the market, in a
passive way. A moderate amount of market power is required to
achieve this . . ,,17 Further, Mr. Justice Gonthier said that if market
power exists independently of the agreement in question (as opposed to
being created by the agreement), "any anti-competitive effect of the
agreement will be suspicious" and that "a particularly injurious beha-
viour [such as price fixing or market-sharing] may also trigger liability
even if market power is not so considerable. '28
In contrast to the approach in the United States, the Canadian
Supreme Court adopted neither a per se rule (which prohibits certain
types of conduct, such as price fixing, regardless of the degree of les-
sening of competition in the market as a whole) nor a full rule of rea-
son standard (which weighs the anti-competitive effects of an agree-
ment against its beneficial consequences).29 Mr. Justice Gonthier
28 For a discussion of the mens rea requirements and other aspects of the criminal conspiracy
provisions of the Competition Act, see Paul S. Crampton & Joel T. Kissack, Recent Developments
in Conspiracy Law and Enforcement: New Risks and Opportunities, 38 McGILL L.J. 569 (1993);
CALVIN S. GOLDMAN, Q.C. & JOHN D. BODRUG, COMPETITION LAW OF CANADA, ch. 8 (1994).
2 R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, 43 C.P.R. 1, 34 (3d ed., 1992 (hereinafter
"PANS").
28 Id. at 36-37.
29 For a discussion of the U.S. law, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVEL-
OPMENTs 30-59 (3d ed., 1992); In particular, citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), the text indicates that, under the rule of reason, the fact finder weighs all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
[Vol. 21:127 1995
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characterized the Canadian conspiracy provision as mandating a "par-
tial rule of reason inquiry into the seriousness of the competitive effects
of the agreement". 30 Mr. Justice Gonthier stated that:
[C]onsiderations such as private gains by the parties to the agreement
or counterbalancing efficiency gains by the public lie . . . outside of
the inquiry under s. [45]. Competition is presumed by the Act to be in
the public benefit. The only issue is whether the agreement impairs
competition to the extent that it will attract liability.31
Since the PANS decision, the Canadian antitrust authorities have
indicated an intention to interpret PANS as precluding any considera-
tion of procompetitive aspects of an agreement. For example, even if
the agreement results in the introduction of a new product, a Canadian
Department of Justice lawyer has stated that "this would be no de-
fence."3 2 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the courts will
interpret the PANS decision in a similar manner.
The Competition Act may be less flexible than the U.S. law in
accommodating information exchanges, such as benchmarking or col-
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. Subsequent cases have limited the scope of the
inquiry to whether the restraint is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competi-
tion. In this regard, the text further notes that some cases appear to equate competition with
"economic efficiency," while others interpret it, apparently more broadly, to refer to the process of
rivalry among firms. Id. at 42-43. See also Presley Warner & Michael Trebilcock, Rethinking
Price Fixing Law, 38 McGILL L.J. 679, 693 (1993) (citing Bork).
so PANS, supra note 27, at 31.
s' Id. In this regard, Mr. Justice Gonthier cited and expanded upon the following passage
from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the Howard Smith case: "[t]he statute proceeds
upon the footing that the preventing or lessening of competition is in itself an injury to the public.
It is not concerned with public injury or other public benefit from any other standpoint." Howard
Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. The Queen, 29 C.P.R. 6, 13 (1957).
31 John S. Tyhurst, Section 45 of the Competition Act: When Does Co-operation Become
Conspiracy, Paper Delivered to Insight Conference on Emerging Issues in Competition Law, To-
ronto, Ontario 12-14 (Mar. 10, 1994):
It would not be open to an accused to attempt to escape liability [under section 45] by
arguing that an agreement which lessens competition to an undue degree nevertheless had
the effect of lowering costs or permitting past or future gains in efficiency . . . As stated
earlier, in the United States, it is possible to argue, notwithstanding the anti-competitive
effects of an agreement in restraint of trade (even a so-called 'per se' offence such as price
fixing), that benefits such as new product introduction or efficiency may be realized which
justify the agreement. In Canada if an agreement lessens competition to an undue degree,
this would be no defence. (emphasis added). Id.
It may, however, be noted that in a paper delivered to a Canadian Bar Association Conference in
1994, Margaret Sanderson of the Bureau of Competition Policy appeared to take a contrary view
when she stated that "while the court's review of objective intent in the Nova Scotia Pharmaceu-
tical Society case suggests there is some consideration of the possible efficiency motivations of
firms when engaging in various practices, it is clearly not the full 'rule of reason' consideration
that is possible under section 79 [abuse of dominant position]." Margaret Sanderson, It Is Better
to Know Some of the Questions Than All of the Answers, Paper Delivered to the Canadian Bar
Association Conference 23 (1994).
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laborative research and development which may possibly lessen some
aspect of competition between the parties, but also have significant
procompetitive effects that arguably outweigh any lessening of competi-
tion. For example, if the manufacturers of a product in Canada were to
agree to standardize certain parts used in the manufacture of the prod-
uct, there may be certain circumstances in which that could be consid-
ered to amount to a lessening in competition between them. But if the
result is to lower the costs to the Canadian manufacturers significantly,
the question is whether that lowering of costs ought to be weighed
against the lessening in competition with respect to the components. In
light of the PANS decision, such a balancing exercise may not be con-
templated by the Canadian conspiracy law.
On the other hand, section 45 does not create a per se rule with
respect to any particular type of agreement. Even a blatant price fixing
agreement could be permissible if the parties have no market power. In
other words, firms with a low market share (for example, below twenty-
five percent in any market in which they compete) may engage in joint
research and development or inter-company collaboration without fear
of violating section 45. (At the same time, a firm with a twenty-five
percent share of a market in Canada may be relatively small by inter-
national standards.)
If the markets in which the parties compete are truly interna-
tional, then two or more competing Canadian firms might not possess
collective market power even if they account for a high percentage of
domestic production. In that case, they may be relatively free to col-
laborate, at least, for the purposes of Canadian law. Parties should also
consider whether collaboration with regard to such international mar-
kets may lead to collusion, or be perceived to lead to collusion, with
regard to any other businesses, products, or markets in which the col-
laborating firms compete. In addition, particularly in light of the Hart-
ford Insurance and Pilkington cases 3 and the international guidelines
released earlier this month by the DOJ and the FTC, 4 the parties
should also consider whether a proposed co-operative project raises is-
sues under the antitrust laws of the United States or any other country
which may be affected.3 5
" Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993); United States v. Pilk-
ington plc, 59 Fed. Reg. 30, 604 (June 14, 1994). For a discussion of the Pilkington decision, see
Robert P. Taylor, Pilkington, Microsoft, and S.C. Johnson Signal a Policy Shift at DOJ, 9 Fall
ANTITRUST 23 (Fall 1994).
11 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Apr. 1995).
" For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of Canadian competition laws, see Cal-
vin S. Goldman et al, International Mergers and the Canadian Competition Act, FORDHAM CORP.
L. INSTIT. 217 (1992); Calvin S. Goldman et al., Canadian Competition Policy in a Competitive
Global Trading Environment, GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY (Edward M. Graham & J. David
Richardson eds., Washington: The Institute for International Economics, forthcoming).
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Geographic markets are not always easy to define and the chal-
lenge for Canadian competition authorities is to adopt a dynamic anal-
ysis and recognize at an early stage that a geographic market is ex-
panding so that Canadian firms are not left behind and permitted to
collaborate only after the international market is well-established. The
current Director appears to be sensitive to this issue. For example, he
has commented that "geographic markets for the purposes of competi-
tion analysis seldom conform to political boundaries." 6 In 1991, when
the current Director was then the Senior Deputy Director responsible
for the Mergers Branch, the Bureau investigated a merger in the elec-
trical distribution equipment business. Although the Bureau concluded
that the merged entity had a "significant" share of the Canadian mar-
ket, the "trend toward a North American market for these products"
was a factor in the Director's decision not to challenge the acquisi-
tion.3 7 More recently, the current Director has commented that "given
the internationalization of markets, competition policy must be flexible
enough both to foster competition and to enable business to make the
structural adjustments necessary to respond to contemporary market
demands." '38
We have suggested that two firms accounting for a significant por-
tion of Canadian production might not possess market power for the
purposes of section 45 if they compete in a wider geographic market
that includes other significant competitors. Conversely, there may be
less antitrust risk to a Canadian firm engaging in a collaborative pro-
ject with a foreign firm that carries on a siinilar business, either on the
basis that the two firms do not compete in the same market or, if they
do compete, there may be enough other foreign competitors in the in-
ternational market such that the collaborating firms would not collec-
tively possess market power. For example, Ford is reported to have sig-
nificantly improved its accounts payable operations after benchmarking
its procedures to those of Mazda. 9
Some consideration should also be given to the strategic plans of
the parties and whether the collaborative activity would preclude new
entry by one of the parties to the joint venture so as to prevent competi-
tion in Canada unduly. We are not aware of the Director having chal-
lenged any transaction on this basis in Canada to date, however an
issue could arise if one of the parties was a uniquely poised entrant and
had specific pre-existing plans to enter the market if the collaborative
" George N. Addy, The Competition Act and the Telecommunication Industry, Address to
the Institute for International Research Telecommunications Conference, Toronto 11 (Mar. 29,
1994).
37 Schneider/Square D, Backgrounder, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Sept. 17,
1991 at 3.
Addy, supra note 5, at 1.
" Slowey, supra note 2, at 31.
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project did not proceed.
In light of the low threshold of moderate market power for an un-
due lessening of competition established in the PANS decision, it can
be seen that there is reason to be cautious about any type of collabora-
tive arrangement with a competitor where there is some possibility that
the parties to the arrangement could be considered to have market
power and the arrangement may be viewed as resulting in some lessen-
ing of competition, even if the project is likely to bring about significant
benefits to the economy as a whole.
Even after the PANS decision, however, it can still be argued that
section 45 should not prohibit collaboration to bring a new product to
market where, in the absence of the agreement in question, the product
would likely not have been brought to market at all. In such a case, a
court may still be entitled to find that the agreement is not likely to
lessen competition unduly, even though, in isolation, one element of the
arrangement could be characterized as lessening some aspect of compe-
tition. In other words, if the effect of prohibiting the agreement would
be to prevent the product from coming to the market, it would seem to
be an overly narrow approach for a court to focus only on one aspect of
the agreement that cannot be separated from the entire arrangement.
A broader perspective would be consistent with the "purpose clause" of
the Competition Act, which indicates that the Act is intended to pro-
mote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy and the
expansion of opportunities for Canadian participation in world
markets.40
The 1988 International Guidelines issued by the DOJ, for exam-
ple, suggested that efficiencies enabling parties to provide a new service
that otherwise would not be available ought to be taken into account in
a rule of reason analysis. 41 The difference between the U.S. and Cana-
dian approach in this regard is illustrated by the BMI decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1979. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a rule of reason analysis should apply to blanket licence
agreements issued by two associations of composers with respect to the
use of copyrighted musical compositions at fees negotiated by the as-
sociations. That decision was based partly on the Court's finding that it
would be virtually impossible for thousands of composers to negotiate
individually over the use of each song, for each user to report the
amount of use, and for each composer to police the use of his works by
authorized and unauthorized users. In essence, the agreement created a
40 COMPETITION ACT, § 1.1; However, the "purpose clause" further states that the Competi-
tion Act is also intended to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable
opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and provide consumers with competitive
prices and product choices. Id.
41 COMPETITION ACT, § 3.0; The 1995 U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Interna-
tional Operations released earlier this month do not contain a similar discussion.
[Vol. 21:127 1995
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forum for buyers and sellers that yielded improvements in the market
as a whole. Similarly, in the Nabanco case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the l1th Circuit upheld a uniform interchange fee payable to issu-
ers of bank credit cards in the VISA system because individual fee
negotiations were impractical, would produce instability and higher
fees, and could result in the demise of the credit card system.42 The
blanket licences in the BMI case could be regarded as lessening compe-
tition with respect to royalties or other terms of the agreement and the
uniform interchange fee in Nabanco could be regarded as limiting com-
petition in the fee charged by the card issuing banks in the VISA sys-
tem; however, it is not clear whether the resulting benefits could be
taken into account under a section 45 analysis.
D. Exemptions to the Conspiracy Provisions
Conspiracies or agreements relating only to the export of products
from Canada are exempt from section 45. However, to be exempt they
must not be likely to result in a reduction or limitation of the real value
of exports, restrict any person in the export of products, or lessen com-
petition unduly in the supply of services facilitating the export of prod-
ucts from Canada. No registration is required to rely on this exemp-
tion. It is also important to ensure that information exchanges among
parties to an export consortium do not unnecessarily extend into other
areas that may be relevant to competition in the domestic market. Fur-
ther, parties to such an agreement should be cognizant of potential re-
strictions under the antitrust laws of the countries into which their
products are exported or other countries that may be affected by their
agreement.
Agreements entered into with the federal government or a provin-
cial government, or more generally, conduct undertaken pursuant to a
statutory direction or authorization may fall outside the scope of the
Competition Act on the basis of the "regulated conduct defence;" how-
ever, separate consideration of whether such government involvement
may constitute a defence under U.S. or other foreign antitrust laws
may be required, and a number of questions remain concerning the
application of the regulated conduct defense to reviewable matters
under the Competition Act.
The Competition Act provides a further limited exemption for
agreements relating only to cooperation in research and development,
exchanging statistics, defining product standards, advertising restric-
tions, and measures to protect the environment. However, to benefit
from the exemption, any such agreement must not be likely to lessen
competition unduly in respect of prices, production, markets, custom-
ers, or channels of distribution and must not be likely to restrict any
42 National Bancard Corp. v. Visa USA, Inc., 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
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person from entering into or expanding a business. This exemption may
be helpful for a particular proposal but, in light of these limitations and
the low threshold described in the PANS decision, it is unclear whether
and to what extent this exemption either permits agreements that
would otherwise be prohibited or provides a practical degree of comfort
to business persons to proceed with these types of agreements where
there would otherwise be some cause for concern.43
E. Director's Draft Information Bulletins on Strategic Alliances
In September 1994, the Director issued a draft information bulle-
tin on strategic alliances because he was concerned that "if there is
uncertainty regarding the legality of strategic alliances, there is a risk
that alliances that are beneficial for competition and the efficiency of
the economy may not be pursued.""' However, the 1994 draft bulletin
reinforced the view that the Director was adopting an overly conserva-
tive approach to the enforcement of section 45. For example, the Cana-
dian Manufacturers' Association (CMA) commented that the 1994
draft bulletin's discussion of the conspiracy provisions in section 45 of
the Act was "so strong that the comforting parts of the document are
overshadowed" and that "the draft bulletin tends to discourage rather
than support the formation of procompetitive arrangements. '45
43 DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION & RESEARCH, COMPETITION ACT, DRAFT INFORMATION
BULLETIN ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT (Feb. 1995) (hereinafter
DRAFT INFORMATION BULLETIN). This exemption may be lost if there is even an unintended les-
sening or prevention of competition with respect to one of the specified areas. The draft bulletin
adds that:
[C]onsequently, a strategic alliance which may be directed primarily at research and devel-
opment, but which is likely to have an undue effect on prices owing to an ancillary arrange-
ment to jointly market and distribute the newly produced goods or services, may cause the
Director to initiate an inquiry under the conspiracy provisions. Id. at 15.
11 George N. Addy, Address to the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, Ottawa 2 (Mar. 7,
1995).
" Id. at 3. For example, the 1994 draft bulletin commented as follows on the risk of informa-
tion sharing between competitors in the context of a hypothetical benchmarking exercise between
clothing retailers with respect to administration, warehousing, and distribution costs:
[I]f the parties to the wider strategic alliance possess market power, and if it is found that,
because of the information exchange, there is reduced uncertainty about the competitive
reaction of rivals and that this is likely to lead to an undue lessening or prevention of compe-
tition, the firms risk violating the conspiracy provisions of the Act. Under these circum-
stances, competition concerns could arise even in cases where the information to be shared
does not relate to future pricing, capacity or marketing strategies. This of course, requires a
full examination into whether the parties to the benchmarking exercise collectively hold mar-
ket power. Where they do, an exchange of information is more likely to raise competition
concerns. . . . The difficulty with any information exchange between horizontal competi-
tors, particularly exchanges involving commercially sensitive information such as costs, is
that it is difficult to know when a benign exchange becomes potentially liable under the
Competition Act. The importance of exercising extreme caution cannot be over emphasized,
given the fact that potential criminal liability is involved. (emphasis added)
[Vol. 21:127 1995
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In February 1995, the Director issued a revised draft information
bulletin on strategic alliances. The revised draft recognizes that "many
firms are facing external pressures to become more innovative and effi-
cient in order to remain competitive in domestic and foreign markets.
These pressures include falling trade barriers; innovations which affect
the types of products and services produced, the production process, or
the organization of firms and institutions; and, consumer demands for
better product and service quality, highly customized products and ser-
vices, and greater product and service variety. . . .The response of
some firms to these pressures is to form strategic alliances. ' 46
The draft bulletin also states that:
[O]nly those elements of a strategic alliance which represent a serious
restraint of competition would be targeted by the conspiracy law. This
means that many of the beneficial aspects of a strategic alliance may
not be challenged. For example, where competitors develop technology
sharing agreements and reciprocal patent licensing there may not be a
serious adverse effect on competition, but where ancillary to these ar-
rangements the parties begin to allocate markets between themselves
or agree on prices, then this may run afoul of the conspiracy provi-
sions. Unless the benign elements of the cooperative arrangements are
seen as part of a broader conspiracy they will not be challenged by the
Bureau.4 7
Further, the revised draft bulletin comments that strategic alli-
ances often involve a considerable exchange of information between the
parties and that "information exchange among competitors who collec-
tively possess market power may have serious adverse effects on compe-
tition, depending upon the nature and timing of the information ex-
change", particularly where the parties compete in markets with high
levels of concentration, barriers to entry and relative stability, and the
information exchange "may reduce uncertainty about rivals' competi-
tive responses and so act to further temper rivalry. '48 The draft bulle-
tin adds that:
[T]he risk that an inquiry may be initiated in respect of information
sharing increases with several factors. First, the greater the market
power collectively held by the parties to the information exchange, the
more likely an information exchange in respect of any significant as-
pect of rivalry may adversely impact competition. Second, when par-
ticularly sensitive information important to rivalry is shared, this may
be more likely to be viewed as behaviour injurious to competition. In
DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, COMPETITION ACT, DRAFT INFORMATION BULLE-
TIN, COMPETITION ACT 25 (Aug. 26, 1994). This passage was omitted from the revised draft
issued in February of this year.
4' DRAFT INFORMATION BULLETIN, supra note 43, at 6.
47 Id. at 14.
48 Id. at 16.
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this regard, firms should be cautious about exchanging information in
respect of current or future pricing, trading terms or marketing strat-
egies. Firms should also be cautious in sharing the analyses or conclu-
sions developed from the information exchange, in order to preserve
their ability to act independently beyond the alliance. Direct ex-
changes of sensitive commercial information between competitors are
riskier than those made through an independent third party, although
care needs to also be taken when involving third parties. Similarly, the
exchange of disaggregated data which allows for identification of an
individual firm's plans is riskier than exchanges involving aggregated
data. Third, any evidence of anti-competitive intent increases the like-
lihood that an inquiry may be initiated. Evidence of coercion on the
part of one or more of the alliance partners to have another party act
in a prescribed anticompetitive manner may lead to an inference of
anticompetitive intent."'
With respect to non-price aspects of competition, the draft bulletin
comments that "in cases where product quality, service, promotional
activity or innovation are an important determinant of competitive ri-
valry such that an Agreement in respect of one of these is likely to have
a significant adverse effect on competition between the parties, the Di-
rector may view such agreements as providing grounds for inquiry"
(emphasis added)." Although the revised draft bulletin has a less ag-
gressive tone and tries to be more helpful than the 1994 draft, it still
leaves a great deal of room for grey areas and resulting uncertainty.
F. Specialization Agreements
The specialization agreement provisions of the Competition Act,
which were added in 1986, provide a further "defense" to the conspir-
acy provisions that reflects the efficiency enhancing purpose of the leg-
islation. A specialization agreement is defined as an agreement under
which each party agrees to discontinue production of a particular arti-
cle or service. An agreement registered under this provision is exempt
19 Id. The 1995 draft bulletin also provides a helpful illustrative example with respect to
information sharing. Id. at 28-30.
60 Id. at 13. Further, the information sharing example in the 1995 draft bulletin discusses a
benchmarking exercise between an appliance manufacturer and one of its competitors with respect
to administration, warehousing, and distribution costs in a situation where neither firm could indi-
vidually afford an information technology system, but each needs to utilize such a system in order
to remain competitive with the largest firms in the industry. The 1995 draft bulletin initially
comments that the two firms are unlikely to have market power given that larger firms in the
industry are not participating with them, but adds that if the parties did have market power, "the
benchmarking exercise could give rise to reduced uncertainty about the competitive reaction of
rivals. Under these circumstances, a competition issue could arise even in cases where the infor-
mation to be shared does not relate to future pricing, output or marketing strategies." (emphasis
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from challenge under either the criminal conspiracy provisions or cer-
tain reviewable provisions of the Competition Act relating to exclusive
dealing. It covers only strategic alliances where each party wants
longer production runs of one product.
The Tribunal may register such an agreement where it finds that
the agreement has been made free of any coercion and the efficiency
gains likely to result from the agreement are greater than the likely
effects of any lessening of competition. If the expected efficiency gains
fail to outweigh the lessening of competition likely to result from the
agreement, the Tribunal could make registration conditional on the di-
vestiture of assets or the broader licensing of patents or certain other
actions. As noted above, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to con-
sider the positive impact of efficiency gains under a "partial rule of
reason" analysis in conspiracy cases. However, it is clear that the Tri-
bunal could register some types of specialization agreements which
would otherwise offend the conspiracy provisions in section 45.
In 1986, it was hoped that the specialization agreements would
play a significant role in facilitating the restructuring of Canadian
businesses, but so far these provisions have not been used. Representa-
tives of the Bureau have suggested several possible explanations for
their lack of use: (1) "[iun most cases, the general standards applicable
under the merger and conspiracy provisions of the Competition Act
probably provide sufficient scope for efficient cooperative arrange-
ments;" (2) the specific wording of the provisions, which may be per-
ceived as limiting their application; (3) procedural difficulties, particu-
larly in respect of the specialization agreement provisions which involve
proceedings before the Tribunal; and (4) concerns that even if a partic-
ular arrangement is sanctioned under the Competition Act, it might
raise concerns under the competition laws of other jurisdictions, such as
the United States, in which the parties operate. 51 Further study of this
issue is required.
G. Mergers
For the purposes of the Competition Act, a "merger" is defined
broadly to include any form of an acquisition of control over or a "sig-
nificant interest" in the whole or a part of a business. The Director
considers that the merger provisions may apply not only to acquisitions
of shares or assets, but also to agreements that give a person the ability
to control or influence materially another business.52 Asset transactions
which may fall within the scope of the Act's merger provisions include
purchases or leases of a brand name or intellectual property rights. 58 If
51 Anderson & Khosla, supra note 18, at 88.
52 See discussion supra at Part I.
'3 See discussion supra at Part I.
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he determines that a merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition
substantially, the Director may apply to the Tribunal for an order to
dissolve or enjoin a merger at any time within three years of the sub-
stantial completion of the merger.54 With respect to mergers and other
reviewable matters, the Director also has the power to seek interim
injunctions.55
In defining relevant product and geographic markets, the Direc-
tor's Merger Enforcement Guidelines adopt a "hypothetical monopo-
list" approach which is similar to that described in the 1992 U.S. Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines. The Competition Act specifically provides
that the Tribunal may not rely solely on market shares in assessing
whether a merger is likely to lessen competition. 6 However, the
Merger Guidelines state that the Director is not likely to challenge a
merger on the basis of concerns regarding the unilateral market power
of the parties to the transaction if the post-merger market share will be
less than thirty-five percent. Similarly, the Director is not likely to
challenge a merger on the basis of concerns relating to the interdepen-
dent exercise of market power where the four largest firms in the mar-
ket would account for less than a sixty-five percent market share or
where, notwithstanding this fact, the merged entity would have less
than a ten percent share.57 These are not fixed rules. A merger below
these thresholds could be challenged and many mergers with market
shares above these thresholds are not challenged. In the first contested
merger case, the Tribunal declined to dissolve a merger which resulted
in a sixty percent market share in the rendering business in Southern
Ontario.58 Both the Director and the Tribunal will permit market share
thresholds that are clearly much higher than levels which would likely
be challenged in the United States.
Another distinguishing feature of Canadian merger enforcement
compared to that in the United States is that the Director's focus, at
least to date, has been on the likelihood of the merged entity being able
to exercise unilateral market power, rather than an assessment of the
" COMPETITION ACT § 92. In addition, certain large mergers may be subject to pre-closing
notification and waiting period requirements. Id. at Part IX. Part IX is similar to the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act in the United States. Whether or not a merger exceeds the
compulsory pre-closing notification criteria, all mergers of all sizes are subject to the substantive
merger provisions of the Act. For a discussion of the pre-merger notification provisions of the
Competition Act, see Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 26, at § 10.09. For a discussion of the
merger provisions generally, see GOLDMAN & BODRUG, supra note 26, at ch. 10. See also PAUL S.
CRAMPTON, MERGERS AND THE COMPETITION ACT (1990).
55 COMPETITION ACT §§ 100 & 104.
:6 COMPETITION ACT § 92(2).
7 MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.2.1.
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likelihood of interdependent conduct.59 The Canadian de-emphasis of
market share and the risk of interdependent conduct reflects a recogni-
tion of the relatively concentrated markets in Canada and the need for
Canadian firms to achieve internationally competitive economies of
scale.
The Competition Act contains a list of factors which the Tribunal
may take into account in assessing a merger, including: (1) the impact
of foreign competitors; (2)y barriers to entry (including tariffs and regu-
latory control over entry); (3) the degree of effective competition re-
maining; (4) whether the merger will result in the removal of a vigor-
ous and effective competitor; and (5) the nature and extent of change
and innovation in a relevant market.60 There is, therefore, specific stat-
utory recognition of innovation as a factor in assessing a merger. Of
these factors, foreign competition and the level of barriers to entry ap-
pear to have the greatest influence on the Director's decision whether to
challenge a merger.61
In the context of strategic alliances, joint research and collabora-
tion between competitors, the express requirement that the Tribunal
consider the nature and extent of change and innovation in the relevant
market can be particularly important. For example, the Director has
commented that:
[T]echnological change can drastically alter the definition of relevant
antitrust markets. There is perhaps no better example of this than the
potential effect on competition of the convergence of telephone, cable,
broadcast, wireless, and computer technologies. Technological change
and innovation can broaden the definition of relevant markets, in-
crease the opportunities for competitive entry, and constrain the exer-
cise of market power by incumbent firms.62
Similarly, the Director's Merger Enforcement Guidelines state
that:
[T]he pressures imposed on remaining competitors in a market by the
" MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.2. However, the Tribunal has identified "enhanced ability for
tacit collusion" as one of the issues which should be the focus of attention in any merger case.
Director of Investigation and Research v. Imperial Oil Ltd. CT/89-3, #390 (Comp. Trib.) 54
(Jan. 26, 1990).
60 COMPEnTON AcT § 93.
" See R.S. Khemani & D.M. Shapiro, An Empirical Analysis of Canadian Merger Policy,
41 J. INDUsT. ECON. 161, Table II (June 1993). In addition, the Merger Guidelines indicate that
"the assessment of information relating to future entry [§ 93(d)], business failure, and exit
[§ 93(b)], or effective remaining competition [§ 93(e)] may, in certain circumstances, provide a
sufficient basis, in and of itself, for concluding that a merger is not likely to prevent or lessen
competition substantially. That is to say, this conclusion may be arrived at notwithstanding the
existence of information that is, on balance, unfavourable to the merger in terms of each of the
other factors that may be relevant under section 93." MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.
62 Addy, supra note 5, at 11-12.
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nature and extent of dynamic developments in any of these areas [i.e.,
distribution, service, sales, marketing, packaging, buyer tastes,
purchase patterns, firm's structure, the regulatory environment, and
the economy as a whole] may be such as to ensure that a material
price increase is unlikely to occur or will not be sustainable. This may
be especially the case where a merger stimulates or accelerates the
change or innovation in question."3
At the same time, consideration of innovation and future changes
in the market can give rise to other possible issues. For example, the
Director has commented that:
[I]n rapidly changing industries such as telecommunications, it may
be less important to focus on the potential effects of a particular
transaction on existing levels of competition. Instead, it could perhaps
be more helpful to look forward and consider if the transaction would
likely 'prevent' future competition that might otherwise come about as
a result of technological expansion.64
Thus, for example, if in the absence of a proposed joint venture one of
the parties would likely have entered the market as an independent
competitor, the joint venture may be considered to have prevented com-
petition. We are not, however, aware of the Director having challenged
any joint venture or other transaction on that basis to date.
H. The Efficiency Exception for Mergers
The Competition Act expressly provides that the Tribunal may not
make an order under the merger provisions if it finds that (1) the gains
in efficiency likely to be brought about by the merger will be greater
than, and will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of com-
petition that is likely to result from the merger, (2) the claimed effi-
ciency gains would not likely be attained if the order enjoining the
merger were made, and (3) the alleged efficiency gains would not be
brought about by reason only of a redistribution of income. As noted
above, efficiencies may not be balanced against anti-competitive conse-
quences of an agreement in the context of the criminal conspiracy pro-
visions. Combined with the fact that affiliated entities cannot conspire
with one another,65 this can result in the paradoxical situation in which
two competitors can fully merge their businesses, without violating the
conspiracy provisions or providing grounds for a remedial order under
the civil provisions of the Competition Act, in circumstances where less
extensive co-operation between them could possibly violate the criminal
conspiracy provisions in section 45 of the Act. Thus, the current state
63 MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.9.
" Addy, supra note 5, at 9.
065 COMPETITION ACT § 45(8).
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of the law could encourage parties to merge to avoid criminal liability
with respect to collaboration between them and thereby tolerate rela-
tively more anti-competitive action while relatively less anti-competitive
conduct is prohibited."6
In addition, the Competition Act directs the Tribunal to consider
whether such efficiency gains will result in a significant increase in the
real value of exports or a significant substitution of domestic products
for imported products. Conflicting views have been expressed about
how any such an increase in exports or substitution of imports is to be
taken into account.67 A full panel of the Tribunal is yet to rule on this
issue.
In the Hillsdown case, the first contested merger proceeding
before the Tribunal, both the Director and the acquiror took the posi-
tion that section 96 directs the Tribunal to balance the gains in effi-
ciency likely to arise from a merger against the misallocation of re-
sources or the "deadweight loss" to society as a whole resulting from
any increased prices which the merged firm is able to impose as a result
of the merger. This has been characterized as a "total welfare" ap-
proach. In the Director's view, it is not necessary to establish that the
efficiency gains will be passed on to the consumer. The Tribunal sug-
gested, however, that section 96 could be read to permit it to take into
account a much broader range of effects, including wealth transfers.6 8
After referring to the above-noted purpose clause of the Competi-
tion Act, the Tribunal also generally reviewed "the various purposes
served by competition law in relation to efficiency gains" and com-
mented that:
[O]ne traditional purpose has been to protect the consumer from be-
ing charged supra-competitive prices. While one can argue that this is
insignificant from the point of view of loss to the economy as a whole,
• . . there is a powerful political argument for preventing such accre-
tions of wealth at the consumer's expense. Another purpose which has
traditionally been seen as served by competition law is to encourage
the dispersal of power and the distribution of wealth . . . A third
objective of competition law is seen as that of protecting the small
firm against more powerful rivals . . . . These objectives can run
counter to the fourth objective which is that of furthering the effi-
ciency of the economy as a whole.69
Against this background, the Tribunal questioned whether it was ap-
propriate to give precedence to the efficiency objective in the purpose
"1 See Thomas W. Ross, Proposals for a New Canadian Competition Law on Conspiracy, 36
ANTITRUST BULL. 851, 852 (1991). It is, however, theoretically possible that the merger itself
could be subject to a criminal inquiry.
" See GOLDMAN & BODRUG, supra note 26, at § 10.05. See also CRAMPTON, supra note 54.
68 Hillsdown Holdings, supra note 58, at 343.
6" Id. at 338-39.
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clause over the goals of providing "competitive prices" and "equitable
opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises," which are also
included in the purpose clause.7 0
Finally, the Tribunal raised "as a question" whether wealth trans-
fers are always neutral and posed the following two examples: (1) a
merger of two drug companies where the relevant product is a life-
saving drug, and (2) a merger resulting in a dominant firm which
charges supra-competitive prices and transferring wealth from Canada.
These examples suggest that the Tribunal may be willing to consider a
very broad range of possible negative effects of a merger which must be
demonstrated to be offset by efficiency gains in order for section 96 to
apply.
It has been suggested that the combined effect of the deadweight
loss and the neutral wealth transfer resulting from a price increase typ-
ically far exceeds any efficiencies which may be brought about by a
merger. 71 Thus, the approach of the Tribunal in the Hillsdown case
could leave the efficiency exception as a largely academic possibility."2
Nevertheless, a former Director indicated that the Bureau would con-
tinue to apply the approach set forth in the Merger Guidelines73 and
the current Director has identified the efficiency exception in the Cana-
dian legislation as one of the factors that contributed to different deci-
sions by the Canadian Bureau and the European Commission in the
deHavilland case. 74
L Joint Ventures
The Competition Act expressly prohibits the Tribunal from mak-
ing a prohibition or other remedial order under the merger provisions
of the Act against certain joint ventures with respect to projects that do
not involve the formation of a separate corporation. In order to qualify
for this exception, the joint venture must satisfy the following criteria:
(1) the project would not take place without the joint venture; (2) the
joint venture results in no change in control of any of the parent corpo-
rations; (3) the parties agree in writing to the terms of their relation-
70 Id. at 343.
71 Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1644-45 (1983).
72 See Paul S. Crampton, The Efficiency Exception for Mergers: An Assessment of Early
Signals from the Competition Tribunal, 21 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 371 (1993).
73 Howard I. Wetston, Q.C., Director of Investigation and Research, Decisions and Develop-
ments: Competition Law and Policy, Remarks, Speech #S-10728/92-07, 5 (June 8, 1992).
"' The Director decided not to challenge the proposed acquisition of deHavilland by A6rospa-
tiale/Alenia on the basis that it was not likely to lessen competition substantially in Canada, while
the EC blocked the transaction on the basis that it would create a dominant position in the world
market for commuter aircraft. See George N. Addy, International Coordination of Competition
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ship, including the contribution of assets; (4) the agreement restricts
the range of activities to be carried on by the joint venture and provides
for its termination; and (5) the joint venture does not prevent or lessen
competition except to the extent reasonably required to complete the
joint venture. A former Director has stated that (1) covenants barring
the parent firms from engaging in independent research, (2) require-
ments for the sharing of information about production costs, or (3) re-
strictions on the licensing of technology not developed through the joint
venture could deprive the parties of the benefit of this exception. 5 In
such instances, or others where the joint venture exception does not
apply, the merger review provisions of the Competition Act are fully
applicable.
The Director's Merger Guidelines do not specifically discuss joint
ventures. However, a former Director has elsewhere provided some
general guidance on R&D joint ventures by indicating that a pure joint
venture with no ancillary restraints limiting independent research, pro-
duction, marketing of products, or licensing of technology developed by
the parents would not generally be considered anti-competitive.7 6 On
the other hand, the former Director also expressed the view that a joint
venture extending beyond research to encompass joint production and
marketing of a new product in an industry characterized by high con-
centration, barriers to entry, and no foreign competition "might well be
considered anti-competitive," although this position could still be tem-
pered by the availability of effective substitutes and the expected mar-
ket share of the parent firms. However, the former Director added that
"any covenants barring independent competition by the parent firms
would most likely render the venture unacceptable, unless the venture
could be shown to generate very substantial efficiency gains. 77
There are no publicly reported cases with respect to this joint ven-
ture exception and the Bureau has indicated that it is not aware of any
use of the joint venture defense.7 8 However, these provisions do not re-
quire registration and a similar provision exempts certain joint ventures
from the pre-notification requirements of the Competition Act.79 Thus,
it is possible that private parties may have relied on this exemption
without making either a public announcement or a notification to the
Bureau. It may also be noted that these provisions do not exempt a
joint venture from a challenge under the criminal conspiracy provisions
in section 45 of the Competition Act.
75 Howard I. Wetston, The Treatment of Cooperative R&D Activities under the Competi-
tion Act, CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, Mar. 4, 1988, at 3-4.
76 Id. at 8.
7 Id. at 8-9.
71 See Anderson & Khosla, supra note 18, at 88.
7 COMPETITION ACT § 112.
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J. Abuse of Dominant Position
Another type of reviewable conduct described in the abuse of dom-
inant position provisions of the Competition Act could potentially apply
to intercompany collaboration in Canada if one or more of the compa-
nies involved could be considered to substantially or completely control
a type of business in Canada, either on its own or jointly with other
parties to the arrangement, and their conduct has a predatory, exclu-
sionary, or disciplinary effect on a competitor. Such an effect might be
felt by a competitor that is excluded from the collaborative project.
Before the Tribunal can issue an order under this provision, it must
also find that such persons have engaged in a practice of anti-competi-
tive acts that have had, or are likely to have, the effect of preventing or
lessening competition substantially. This is similar to the test under the
merger provisions. Conduct that might qualify as an anti-competitive
act includes the adoption of product specifications that are incompati-
ble with products produced by other persons and which are designed to
prevent entry by others into, or eliminate others from, a market.
These provisions also recognize the efficiency enhancing objectives
of the Act by expressly requiring the Tribunal to consider whether the
practice in question is a result of superior competitive performance.
The Competition Act also provides that an act engaged in pursuant
only to the exercise of any patent or other intellectual or industrial
property right is not anti-competitive for these purposes.
The abuse of dominant position provisions should not prevent a
group of competitors from collaborating; they may, however, prevent
them from adopting practices or terms of participation that, for exam-
ple, exclude competitors with the result of substantially lessening com-
petition in a market in Canada.
It is also possible that abuse of dominant position issues could
arise even in the context of a joint venture between two firms that do
not compete with one another if one of the participating firms has a
dominant position in a market. For example, one situation that a repre-
sentative of the DOJ has indicated could raise issues is a requirement
that the suppliers of materials to a joint venture refrain from supplying
similar materials to manufacturers that compete with the joint
venture.80
K. Obtaining Certainty with Respect to Specific Proposed Conduct
Particularly outside the context of conspiracy or bid rigging, since
the current legislation was passed in 1986, the Director has adopted an
overall pro-active approach to compliance in enforcing the Competition
Act. Generally, the three individuals who have held the position since
80 Gilbert, supra note 7, at 8.
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May 19861 have favoured consultation and co-operation in investigat-
ing and resolving issues. Pursuant to the Director's Program of Compli-
ance, private persons may seek advisory opinions on whether the Direc-
tor believes that certain proposed conduct would provide grounds for
him to commence an inquiry. 2 Such opinions can be obtained on a
confidential basis. The precise scope of that confidentiality is, however,
subject to some debate.83 Unlike the business review program in the
United States, they are not made public by the Bureau. With respect to
mergers, the Director generally adopts an "open door" policy and a "fix
it first" approach by, for example, being receptive to reasonable propos-
als to negotiate a solution (such as a partial divestiture) to any con-
cerns about possible anti-competitive effects of a merger. Thus, there
may be certain types of proposed collaboration that raise some issues
under the Competition Act, but in respect of which the parties can
obtain sufficient comfort with respect to the Director's enforcement po-
sition to permit them to proceed.
III. INNOVATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY
A. Innovation Markets
A relatively new and potentially significant factor with respect to
the application of antitrust law to innovation is the development of the
concept of an "innovation market" by the U.S. antitrust authorities.8 4
The concept is discussed in the new Intellectual Property Guidelines
issued earlier this month by the DOJ and the FTC. 5 The U.S. guide-
lines indicate that the DOJ and the FTC may be prepared to examine
the effect of a proposed arrangement on "the development of goods that
do not yet exist" or, alternatively, "the development of new or im-
proved goods or processes in geographic markets where there is no ac-
tual or likely potential competition in the relevant goods."8 6 The U.S.
81 Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C., one of the authors of this Article, was the Director from May
1986 until October 1989. His successor, Howard I. Wetston (who is now a Federal Court judge),
was the Director until June 1993. The current Director, Mr. George N. Addy, was the Senior
Deputy Director of Investigation and Research during Mr. Wetston's tenure and counsel to the
Director for the latter part of Mr. Goldman's tenure.
82 DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, PROGRAM OF COMPLIANCE, INFORMATION
BULLETIN No. 3 (Hull, Quebec: Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
" See DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, COMPETITION ACT, THE DRAFT INFOR-
MATION BULLETIN ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT (July
22, 1994); Calvin S. Goldman, Q.C. & Joel T. Kissack, Joint Sovereign Criminal Investigations:
U.S. and Foreign Governments - Can They Really Do That? A Canadian Perspective, Paper
Prepared for the Criminal Antitrust Law and Procedure Workshop, American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law, Dallas, Texas (Feb. 23-24, 1995).
See discussion supra notes 6-7.
'6 DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.3 (Apr. 6, 1995).
86 Id.
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authorities have, in essence, indicated a willingness to consider that rel-
evant antitrust markets may exist for research and development, and
that mergers of firms with specialized assets or characteristics could
lessen competition in a market for research and development.
The U.S. guidelines suggest that a firm may be considered to have
market power with respect to the relevant research and development
comprising an innovation market if it has the ability to retard the pace
of research and development. However, the U.S. guidelines also estab-
lish an antitrust "safety zone" and state that if the arrangements do
not involve a per se offense and, in addition to the parties to the joint
venture (taken collectively), at least four other independently controlled
entities possess comparable capabilities and incentives to undertake
R&D of the relevant product or other products that would be close
substitutes, the U.S. agencies would not likely challenge the joint
venture.
17
One of the bases for the DOJ's challenge to a proposed acquisition
of the Allison Division of General Motors by ZF Friedrichshafen (ZF)
was the alleged likely adverse effects on competition in a worldwide
innovation market for the design and development of new and improved
heavy-duty transmissions for trucks and buses. 88 The DOJ apparently
had concerns in this regard even if General Motors and ZF were
neither actual nor likely potential competitors for automatic transmis-
sions for large trucks and buses in the United States. The elimination
of ZF's separate research and development activities was considered
anti-competitive even if ZF were not itself likely to enter the U.S. mar-
ket with any product it developed.89
The FTC has also recently challenged mergers relating to research
or innovation markets where (1) two out of only three pharmaceutical
companies working on a particular type of vaccine proposed to merge 0
and (2) a dominant supplier of a particular type of medical implant
product acquired a firm that had an exclusive licensing contract with
the Mayo Clinic to develop and sell next-generation implant products
that were at the clinical trial phase, even though the acquired entity
did not currently have any such product.9 1 Finally, in Shell-
Montedison, the FTC entered into a proposed consent order regarding
a joint venture that merged the worldwide polypropylene businesses of
the two parties, including their production, R&D, and licensing tech-
nology operations. The U.S. subsidiary of one of the parties was ex-
cluded from the joint venture, but the FTC complaint alleged that be-
cause of its parent's participation in the joint venture, the subsidiary
87 Id. at ex. 4 & § 4.3.
'8 Gilbert, supra note 7, at 5-6.
88 Id.
90 American Home Products Corp., C-3557 (Feb. 14, 1994).
81 Wright Medical Technology, Inc., C-3564 (Mar. 23, 1995).
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would no longer have sufficient incentive to compete with respect to
R&D and licensing of polypropylene technology. Even the parties' pro-
posal to exclude the parent's innovation and technology licensing busi-
nesses from the joint venture was not sufficient to satisfy the FTC and
the proposed consent order requires divestiture by the parent company
of an integrated polypropylene company sufficient to support continued
research and development in polypropylene technology and to be a
credible licensor of technology. 2
An innovation market is a novel concept that can be expected to
generate significant discussion in legal and academic circles. In the
meantime, while the Canadian antitrust authorities have not yet ex-
pressed any views on the U.S. intellectual property guidelines or the
issues they raise in this regard, the Canadian authorities closely watch
developments in the United States and undoubtedly have had and will
continue to have discussions with their U.S. counterparts concerning
their approach to this concept. It also may be noted that while the
concept of innovation markets has been developed in the context of
mergers, in theory, there would appear to be no basis to preclude its
possible application in the context of the conspiracy provisions of the
Act.
The Canadian Merger Guidelines may go some way to anticipat-
ing innovation markets when they state that:
[I]t is . . . important to assess the extent to which a merger is likely
to facilitate the exercise of market power by impeding the process of
change and innovation. This can occur, for example, where the intro-
duction of new products, processes, marketing approaches, aggressive
R&D initiatives or business methods, etc., is hindered or delayed by a
merger which eliminates a new and innovative firm that presents a
serious threat to incumbent firms.93
Consideration of innovation markets may require a shift in the Bu-
reau's focus on the price effects of an agreement or a merger, both in
assessing the effects of certain conduct94 and in its approach to market
definition.9 5
However, issues arise with respect to whether the assertion of pos-
sible innovation markets may be characterized as dealing with specula-
tive possible outcomes concerning products that do not even currently
exist. As suggested by the Merger Guidelines' above-noted reference to
innovative firms that represent a "serious threat" and the suggestion
92 Shell-Montedison, File no. 941 0043 (Jan. 11, 1995). See also the discussion of this case in
DeSanti, supra note 6, at 10-11.
" MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.9.
" See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1 which state that "[i]n evaluating whether the market
power of the merging parties is likely to be greater than if the merger does not proceed, the focus
is normally on the price dimension of competition."
" See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINFS § 3.1 adoption of the "hypothetical monopolist" test.
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elsewhere in the Guidelines that strong evidence of a prior intent to
enter de novo would be required before the Director would challenge a
conglomerate merger on the basis of concerns about prevention of com-
petition,96 it may be difficult for the Bureau to raise concerns about the
effects of a merger or other conduct on an "innovation market" to a
level that could satisfy either the civil standard of proof with respect to
a likely prevention or lessening of competition or a criminal standard of
proof with regard to an undue lessening of competition.
B. Policy Considerations and Recommendations
In the 1995 draft information bulletin on strategic alliances, the
Director has tried to provide additional guidance to business people re-
garding the criteria under which information sharing and other cooper-
ative arrangements may or may not give rise to inquiries under the
Competition Act. The changes made from the first draft of the bulletin
provide more helpful guidance of the types of arrangements which bus-
iness people can consider without risk of offending the conspiracy provi-
sions of the Act. However, even though the Director should be ap-
plauded for his efforts to provide this guidance, concerns remain that
exchanges of information which may enhance innovation and efficiency
may still be constrained because of the serious risks to individuals and
corporations in the event that any such exchanges do cause the Direc-
tor to commence an inquiry under the Act and possibly lead to criminal
prosecution. The fact is that there are still many grey areas in section
45 of the Act and the enforcement policy of the Director in any given
instance. In other words, leaving aside exchanges of present or future
pricing information or other clearly sensitive competitive information
pertaining to customers, bidding programs, or the like, numerous situa-
tions can arise where, in the absence of jurisprudence or specific policy
guidance from the Director, some risk of an inquiry under the criminal
provisions of the Competition Act remains. For example, exchanges of
past cost data from which pricing patterns may be inferred, can, in
certain circumstances, particularly as between significant competitors
in Canada, give rise to a number of questions as to both the application
of section 45 and the Director's enforcement policy, even though it is
not in the same category as exchanging proposed price lists.
To date, there have been no convictions under the Competition
Act involving conduct amounting to nothing more than an agreement
11 Id. at § 4.12. "In general, conglomerate mergers can only give rise to concerns under the
Act where it can be demonstrated that, in absence of the merger, one of the merging parties
would likely have entered the market de novo . . . Before concluding that de novo entry would
likely have occurred in absence of the merger, the Director generally requires objectively verifiable
information that clearly supports this proposition, e.g., internal documents that pre-date the
merger, recent initiatives by the firm to contest the market, an application for regulatory approval,
or the registration of a patent." Id.
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to exchange information; 97 whenever a conviction has been entered, the
court also found that the accused had engaged in other behaviour, such
as agreeing to fix prices.98 The Deputy Director of the Criminal Mat-
ters Branch of the Bureau has provided some additional guidance on
when information exchanges among industry participants may breach
the conspiracy provisions of the Competition Act. He stated that the
Bureau will consider the structure of the market, whether the parties to
the agreement have engaged in additional conduct that might suggest
the existence of an anti-competitive goal, and the nature of the infor-
mation exchanged. 9 Once again, although the Bureau has made efforts
to provide specific guidance, the examples given offer relatively narrow
latitude for procompetitive information exchanges designed to achieve
greater efficiency and innovation by entities in a market. Similarly, the
1995 draft information bulletin on strategic alliances states that:
[G] enerally, the Bureau will examine alliances that involve the future
acquisition of control as mergers, unless the acquisition of control is
revealed to be a sham. Where there is evidence of a possible agree-
ment in violation of the conspiracy provisions arising from an alliance
or discussion related to a prospective strategic alliance, the Director
will launch a criminal investigation. Factors which bear on this deci-
sion include evidence of an anti-competitive objective or intent, covert
or fraudulent behaviour, the nature of the evidence and whether there
is a need for deterrence through criminal remedies. 100
The qualifications with regard to a possible agreement in violation
of the conspiracy provisions, any anti-competitive "objective or intent,"
and the need for deterrence may diminish the comfort that a business
person may take from this passage. Indeed, in a recent interview given
by the Director, he expressed an unwillingness to define any numerical
market share safe harbor for avoiding issues of undueness under the
Canadian conspiracy provisions.10 1 In contrast, the U.S. antitrust au-
thorities have been prepared to make a more definitive public statement
of their policy with respect to electing to proceed on either a civil or
'7 See Crampton, supra note 1.
Id. at 11.
See Harry Chandler, Competition Law Issues in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry, 31
ALTA. L.R. 72, 81 (1993). In that paper, the Deputy Director offered the following suggestions to
avoid coming into conflict with the Competition Act: (1) the parties should ensure that informa-
tion exchanges are of a generalized nature and non-company specific; (2) individual firms should
be free to determine which policies to follow on their own; (3) information should be based on
historical data with no indication of future prices or trading terms; (4) parties should avoid any
policing to coerce members to follow association guidelines; and (5) where there is a collection of
data from industry participants, they should be collected by an independent firm, and the collec-
tion of the data should ensure that the anonymity of members is preserved. Id.
100 DRAFT INFORMATION BULLETIN, supra note 43, at 11.
101 Interview with George N. Addy, Director of Investigation and Research, Canadian Bu-
reau of Competition Policy 9 ANTITRusT 6, 7-8 (Spr. 1995).
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criminal basis:
[V]iolations of the Sherman Act may be prosecuted as civil or crimi-
nal offenses. Conduct that the Department prosecutes criminally is
limited to traditional per se offences of the law, which typically in-
volve price-fixing, customer allocation, bid-rigging or their cartel ac-
tivities that would also violations of the law in many countries. °2
Because of the historical criminal law limitations of Canadian
competition law, the provision which governs information exchanges
between or among competitors has remained in the criminal law arena
for over 100 years. However, since a 1988 decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada that affirmed the ability of the federal government to
enact competition legislation for non-criminal trade and commerce pur-
poses, l03 the federal Parliament has latitude to amend the conspiracy
provisions to allow for broader types of information exchanges which
ought not to raise criminal issues but may be subject to civil reviewable
provisions under the Competition Act. In fact, Canada is now virtually
alone in its use of a criminal law provision without offsetting efficiency
considerations as the governing law in regard to communications be-
tween competitors. Even in the United States, there is greater latitude
in this area given the ability of the courts to evaluate certain kinds of
non-per se exchanges under the rule of reason. While small Canadian
firms may have greater latitude under the Canadian law as long as they
do not possess market power, if they compete in markets that include
the United States, they may nevertheless be subject to the same per se
restrictions under U.S. law. On the other hand, Canadian firms that
may collectively possess market power in one or more markets can find
themselves at a competitive disadvantage to U.S. firms in relation to
possible exchanges between domestic competitors of information of a
non-per se nature.
One of the most comprehensive analyses of this Canadian issue is
contained in a paper published by Presley Warner and Michael Trebil-
cock. 0 4 In that paper, the authors state that:
[T]he current prohibition [in section 45] is underinclusive because it
can allow manifestly anti-competitive arrangements to escape con-
demnation. We believe that some horizontal arrangements, such as
naked price-fixing and market sharing arrangements must be deterred
with criminal sanctions. But the current prohibition, which requires
the Crown to prove on a criminal burden of proof that an arrange-
ment has lessened competition 'unduly', can allow price-fixers to es-
cape conviction. . . At the same time, the current prohibition is
102 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 2.1 (Apr. 1995).
103 City National Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 1 S.C.R. 641 (1989).
'" Warner & Trebilcock, supra note 29.
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overinclusive because it subjects all horizontal arrangements to crimi-
nal prohibitions and casts a shadow over many arrangements that
may potentially increase welfare. Apart from the obvious price-fixing
case, the welfare effects of many horizontal arrangements are ambigu-
ous, and arrangements with ambiguous welfare effects should not be
deterred and do not require criminal sanctions.105
The authors advocate that the Tribunal is better equipped to analyze
the welfare effects of ambiguous arrangements in comparison to the
criminal courts in Canada. They propose a new criminal prohibition
against covert horizontal arrangements, as opposed to targeting "na-
ked" price-fixing arrangements, which have or are likely to have an
effect on fixing the price of goods or services supplied by the parties to
the arrangement, and which is not the subject of a notification to the
Bureau prior to the time at which the arrangement takes effect or
within a specified time thereafter. The authors advocate that the crimi-
nal prohibition be complemented with a civil review provision which
would involve the Tribunal assessing whether notified arrangements are
likely to lessen competition substantially in the same manner that cur-
rently applies to mergers.
In another paper delivered last year by Timothy Kennish and
Thomas Ross, the authors state that there are many kinds of agree-
ments which have been recognized for some time as not being anti-
competitive even if entered into by actual or potential competitors. 10 6
Examples include agreements not to compete for a specific period of
time which are ancillary to the sale of a business, and agreements on
product standards. Kennish and Ross note that there has been a rapid
increase in various kinds of strategic alliances in recent years, including
arrangements between firms pertaining to R&D, production and distri-
bution joint ventures, sharing of facilities, specialization agreements
and licensing of production or distribution. The authors point out that
even in the United States, in recent years, agreements between compet-
itors are being re-examined in terms of whether they give rise to per se
illegality, apart from agreements that pertain to specific price fixing or
market allocation.107
105 Id. at 690.
'16 Timothy Kennish & Thomas Ross, Toward a New Canadian Approach to Agreements
Between Competitors prepared for the University of Toronto Law and Economics Programme,
Selected Issues in the Economics of Policy, (June 20, 1994). The authors also state that: "[t]here
is widespread agreement that garden-variety price fixing, bid-rigging and market allocation
schemes impose significant social costs and should be prohibited. Indeed, the aggressive approach
toward such agreements taken under U.S. antitrust law is applauded even by those associated with
the Chicago school." Id. at 5 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 273 (1976) &
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUsT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 39 (1976).
107 See Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of The University of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
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In light of the foregoing, Kennish and Ross advocate two types of
reform that would enable the Canadian law to adopt a more realistic
approach to the evaluation of horizontal agreements, including infor-
mation exchanges and strategic alliances. One approach would involve
interpreting the word "unduly" in section 45 as permitting considera-
tion of the benefits of the agreement; however, any such interpretation
would run directly contrary to the PANS case (discussed above) and
would therefore require legislative amendment. A second approach
would involve legislative reform of section 45 to create a civil review
provision governing all types of agreements apart from naked restraints
which would be per se illegal (i.e., the word "unduly" would be deleted
from section 45 with respect to these types of agreements). The authors
propose that all other kinds of agreements which have at least some
beneficial features be made subject to review by the Tribunal in a man-
ner similar to that currently available for mergers, including considera-
tion of efficiencies. 108
The options proposed in the papers discussed above are worth seri-
ous consideration given the potential overbreadth of Canada's current
criminal conspiracy law. Even with the specific guidance offered in the
draft information bulletin on strategic alliances, it is doubtful that busi-
ness persons will find sufficient comfort to allow the kinds of procompe-
titive information exchanges to occur in a manner that could be
achieved without facing the concurrent risk of serious criminal proceed-
ings. The fact will remain that, in the absence of legislative reform or
at least clearer statements of enforcement policy with respect to the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to proceed under the criminal or
civil provisions of the Competition Act, a broad array of strategic alli-
ances and information exchanges may still be subject to the risk of an
inquiry under the criminal provisions of the Canadian legislation. This
situation fails to ensure that Canada is obtaining the maximum innova-
tive development and growth from its firms while still protecting
against anti-competitive economic costs. In the result, Canadian firms
may be placed at a competitive disadvantage. Businesses in Canada do
not have the flexibility that exists under the rule of reason in U.S. law,
nor do they have the latitude to proceed with alternative notification or
clearance processes which exist in other jurisdictions. 0 9 In this respect,
the compatibility of a country's competition laws becomes increasingly
important in a free trade environment. While free trade should not dic-
tate that competition or other laws be identical, as markets are inte-
18 Kennish and Ross also advocate a statutory amendment to provide that where an arrange-
ment constitutes a "merger" for the purposes of section 91 (i.e., it involves an acquisition of con-
trol of a business or a significant interest by one party in the business of another), it should be
exempt from challenge under § 45. Kennish & Ross, supra note 106, at 41.
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grated, differences in competition laws can create competitive
disadvantages.
The Canadian government should consider the experience of the
United States and other jurisdictions which take efficiency and other
procompetitive aspects of inter-firm collaboration into account in this
context. This is especially so given the fact that the United States has
the most vigorously enforced antitrust laws among OECD member
countries. As the Canadian government begins to consider. over the
next year possible amendments to the Competition Act,'10 it makes
sense to re-examine whether it is now time to provide for a balancing
process for various kinds of strategic alliances and information ex-
changes which are not likely to bring about clear costs to consumers
and industries in Canada."'
Our specific proposal is that a strict standard ought to apply in
regard to covert agreements between competitors with respect to pre-
sent or future prices, customer allocations, market allocations, bidding
terms or possibly other analogous matters. Legislative reform in this
area might call for elimination of the "unduly" test in section 45. The
exact scope of this strict standard should be examined carefully by rep-
resentatives of the Bureau and the private sector in an effective consul-
tation process. At the same time, in our view, an agreement should not
be prohibited solely because it is covert unless it relates to one of the
seriously anti-competitive categories. Two competitors may not want to
announce publicly that they are exchanging past quality control proce-
dures, for example, and this should not be problematic. In our view,
110 Addy, supra note 44.
... In a paper delivered to the Canada-U.S. Law Institute in 1993 by Goldman & Kissack,
supra note 5, at 123-26, the authors advocated reforming the conspiracy provisions to more clearly
address information exchanges among competitors, especially for benchmarking purposes. The au-
thors pointed to the legislation's willingness to engage in a balancing process in assessing mergers,
joint ventures and in specialization agreements while not allowing for the same balancing process
in respect of other kinds of horizontal arrangements which are governed by the conspiracy provi-
sion. The question continues to exist whether this distinction is still justified. It may also be noted
that, in December 1993, one of the authors of this paper, C.S. Goldman, raised certain analogous
issues on behalf of the Business & Advisory Industry Committee of the OECD at an OECD
Competition Law and Policy Committee roundtable discussion on horizontal arrangements. On
behalf of BIAC, he indicated that it is important to try to ensure that criminal or other adminis-
trative law restraints on horizontal agreements in OECD countries do not go so far as to preclude
certain kinds of procompetitive industry co-operation designed to attain cost and quality control
by means of processes such as benchmarking. He indicated that these kinds of exchanges as well
as sharing of technological advances and innovation can lead industries to become more efficient
and ultimately more competitive, provided that these exchanges do not involve certain types of
information which will lead to anti-competitive results. He suggested that it would be useful if the
Competition Law and Policy Committee of the OECD were to study this issue and perhaps de-
velop a recommendation to'assist in articulating a set of standards that would allow greater ex-
changes of certain kinds of information among competitors where the efficiency enhancing poten-
tial is high and the risk of competitive injury is correspondingly low. Thus far, the OECD has not
commenced a study of this issue, but it remains to be seen whether it will do so in the future.
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other types of agreements between competitors which do not relate to
one of these categories ought to be subject to review by the Tribunal,
on application by the Director, in a manner analogous to the test for
mergers. This would incorporate a determination of whether efficiency
gains may offset any substantial lessening or prevention of competition.
In the event of an overt agreement which relates to one of the serious
categories and raises significant competition issues, the Director could
seek an injunction from the Tribunal, as he is currently empowered to
do in respect of the civil provisions of the Competition Act. Further,
the consultative assessment process should also consider not only the
availability of interim injunctions but also whether private parties, in
addition to the Director, should have standing to seek injunctions or
damages in respect of both the criminal and civil provisions of the Act.
The Director recently announced the establishment of an Amend-
ments Unit within the Bureau to consider recommending amendments
to the Competition Act."1 2 Although he did not identify any of the mat-
ters discussed in this Article as areas for amendment that the Bureau is
assessing at this time, the formation of the Amendments Unit may pre-
sent an opportunity for interested parties to advocate amendments to
the conspiracy provisions of the Competition Act in order to allow it to
operate in a manner which will more effectively protect both competi-
tion and efficiency enhancing activities of firms in Canada. While cer-
tain types of amendments to other provisions of the Competition Act
may be accomplished in a shorter period, significant changes to sec-
tion 45 are likely to take more time; however, the consultative process
can be commenced in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Competition Act incorporates principles that suggest there is
room for the co-existence of antitrust law and innovation. These princi-
ples are reflected in (1) the R&D "exception" to the conspiracy provi-
sions, (2) the specialization agreement provisions, (3) the joint venture
provisions, (4) the efficiency exception to the merger provisions, and (5)
the purpose clause of the Act. Further, the concepts of market defini-
tion and "undue" or "substantial" lessening of competition, and the
possibility of adopting a dynamic rather than a static competitive mar-
ket analysis, permit a significant degree of flexibility in applying the
Competition Act in an efficiency enhancing manner. The Director also
can encourage efficiency enhancing collaboration by examining certain
types of strategic alliances under the civil merger or abuse of domi-
nance provisions, rather than the criminal conspiracy provisions of the
Competition Act. Also, by continuing to make available to business
persons an effective program of compliance and advisory opinions, the
" Addy, supra note 44, at 10.
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Director can assist Canadian firms in pursuing efficiency enhancing
strategic alliances.
However, real constraints on potential innovation, the achievement
of efficiencies and other pro-competitive aspects of cooperation with
competitors continue to exist under the conspiracy provisions of the
Competition Act. As reflected in the draft information bulletins on
strategic alliances, the Director's approach to the conspiracy provisions
does not give a great deal of latitude to efficiency and innovation justifi-
cations. The analysis of the Supreme Court in the PANS case and the
discussion in the draft strategic alliance bulletin may inhibit certain
types of efficiency enhancing collaborations and place Canadian firms
at a competitive disadvantage. At the same time, in the context of
merger reviews, the Director has recognized the importance of assess-
ing the dynamics of changing markets, particularly in the telecommu-
nications area. In this respect, antitrust policy in Canada ought not to
be saddled with a static approach in any area, including information
exchanges and other kinds of potentially pro-competitive understand-
ings between competitors. It is now time to undertake serious reconsid-
eration of the scope of Canada's criminal prohibition in this area of the
law.
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